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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20041095-CA

vs.
DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a guilty plea to theft, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
At probation revocation, does the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibit
reinstating a suspended prison sentence consecutively to other sentences imposed
for crimes committed while defendant was on probation?
Standard of Review. Defendant failed to preserve this issue for review. Thus,
no standard of review applies.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Defendant's appeal concerns the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401
(West 2004), attached as Addendum, and the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which states the following:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
On December 4, 2003, defendant pled guilty to one count of theft, a third
degree felony (R. 16-23). At the same proceeding, Judge Noel sentenced him to a
suspended prison term of zero to five years and placed him on probation for
eighteen months under the supervision of Adult Probation and Parole (R. 66-67;
55:14-15). Judge Noel did not sign or enter a sentencing order. At the time,
defendant was nineteen and had no adult criminal history (R. 55:5,12-13).
Two months later, defendant robbed Dr. John's Lingerie and Novelty Store at
gunpoint (R. 27). He was caught soon thereafter, and on August 16, 2004, was
convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery with firearm enhancements (R. 38).
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Judge Atherton sentenced him to concurrent prison terms for the robbery
convictions (R. 55:18-19).
On December 6,2004, defendant appeared before Judge Reese for a probation
revocation hearing on his theft conviction (R. 42; 55:17). Defendant admitted to
violating his probation by robbing Dr. John's, and Judge Reese accordingly revoked
his probation (R. 42; 55:18). Judge Reese then stated, "I guess the question is
concurrent or consecutive" (R. 55:18). Adult Probation and Parole recommended
that "the original order of the court be imposed to the fullest extent of the law" (R.
55:18). Defendant argued that the sentence should run concurrent because Judge
Atherton had imposed concurrent sentences and her sentence was after Judge
Noel's original sentence (R. 55:19).
Judge Reese noted that defendant's probation violation concerned "serious
violent charges apparently involving firearms" (R. 55:19). He decided "that it
would be just in [his] judgment t o . . . run this charge consecutively with the others"
(R. 55:19). Defendant stated, "Judge, given this is after it we would object to that
taking place" (R. 55:19). The court said, "Pardon?" and defense counsel repeated,
"Just for the record we would object to that" (R. 55:19). Judge Reese replied, "Okay.
Fair enough," and the proceeding concluded (R. 55:19).
Judge Reese signed the sentencing minutes and entered them in the record (R.
42-43). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from that order (R. 45).
3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Defendant's claim that running his prison term for theft consecutive to his
prison terms for aggravated robbery violates the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment is unpreserved. Defendant never objected on that ground below. He
has not asserted plain error, exceptional circumstances, or ineffective assistance of
counsel on appeal. He has thus waived issue, and this Court should refuse to
consider it.
Defendant's claim also lacks merit. The Double Jeopardy clause prohibits
multiple punishments for the same offense or increasing a punishment for an
offense once the punishment has been imposed.

Defendant received one

punishment for his theft charge: a zero to five year prison term. Running that term
consecutive to other terms defendant was serving did not increase the severity of
his sentence.

4

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIM IS UNPRESERVED;
MOREOVER, IT LACKS MERIT

Defendant asserts that Judge Reese violated the Double Jeopardy clause when
he ordered defendant to serve his prison term for theft consecutively to his prison
terms for aggravated robbery. Br. Aplt. at 6. He claims that only Judge Atherton
had the authority to run his sentences consecutively. Br. Aplt. at 11. Defendant's
claim is both unpreserved and lacking in merit.
A. Defendant's double jeopardy claim is unpreserved.

"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised
on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1 11,10 P.3d 346. This "rule applies to
every claim, including constitutional questions . . . ." Id. To properly preserve a
claim, a party must give the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue. See State
v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, \ 6,975 P.2d 476. "A trial court has the opportunity to
rule if the following three requirements are met: (1) the issue must be raised in a
timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must
introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. (citations and
internal quotations omitted). To be specifically raised, an objection must "be
specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error . . . complained of,"
Beehive Medical Elec, Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983), so that the
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court "might have an opportunity to correct [it] if [the court] deems it proper/ 7
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47,51 (Utah 1974).
This Court may review an unpreserved claim only if it finds exceptional
circumstances or plain error. See Holgate 2000 UT 74, % 11. Appellants must,
however, raise plain error and exceptional circumstances in their opening brief,
otherwise the claim is waived. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, % 23,16 P.3d 540
("Generally, issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were not presented
in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the
appellate court."); State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, f 12 n.4,63 P.3d 110 (refusing
to consider robbery defendant's unpreserved claim that State never proved that he
had purpose to deprive where defendant raised plain error for the first time in reply
brief); State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, \ 33 n.5, 64 P.3d 1218 (refusing to consider
defendant's unpreserved claim that jury instructions were incorrect where
defendant raised plain error for first time in reply brief), cert, denied, 72 P.3d 685; cf.
Utah R. App. P. 24(c) ("Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter
set forth in the opposing brief."). This rule prevents "unfairness to the respondent if
an argument or issue [is] first raised in the reply brief and the respondent [has] no
opportunity to respond." Glover, 2000 UT 89, % 23.
Defendant never objected to his sentence on double jeopardy grounds. When
the trial court raised the question of consecutive or concurrent sentencing, defense
6

counsel noted that Judge Atherton had imposed concurrent sentencing on
defendant's aggravated robbery charges (R. 55:18-19). He then said, "I don't know
if it was ever, what the sentence was in the first place if you ordered it consecutive
or not but if you ordered it concurrent then it would be our position that that
concurrent sentencing would rule the day" (R. 55:19). The court then ordered
defendant to serve his theft sentence consecutively with his aggravated robbery
sentence (R. 55:19). Defendant replied, "Just for the record we would object to that"
(R. 55:19).
Defendant's objection did not alert the court to the alleged double jeopardy
violation he now asserts on appeal. In fact, it is unclear on what grounds defendant
objected in the trial court. He first mentioned Judge Atherton's sentence on the
aggravated robbery charges, but then argued that court was bound by the sentence
imposed at the original theft sentencing hearing (R. 55:18-19). Defendant concluded
by just objecting generally "for the record" (R. 55:19). Defendant now raises a
double jeopardy claim for the first time in this Court. He never gave the trial court
an opportunity to rule on his double jeopardy claim. See McGuire, 1999 UT App 45,
\ 6. Defendant has not argued plain error, exceptional circumstances, or ineffective
assistance of counsel, and this Court should therefore refuse to consider his claim.
See Glover, 2000 UT 8 9 , 1 2 3 .

7

B. Defendant was not twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's double jeopardy claim, the
claim lacks merit.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides three basic protections: "It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,717 (1969),
overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 803 (1989).
Defendant claims his consecutive sentences violate the third of these
protections. Br. Aplt. at 11. Specifically, he asserts that Judge Reese put him twice
in jeopardy of the same offense when he "amended the original sentence and
ordered it to run consecutively with the other sentences [defendant] was ordered to
serve in another case by Judge Atherton." Br. Aplt. at 11. He further claims, "Only
Judge Atherton, who sentenced [defendant] after Judge Noel sentenced him in this
case, had jurisdiction and authority to order consecutive sentencing in the
aggravated robbery case based on [defendant's past and present criminal conduct."
Br. Aplt. at 11.

8

Defendant's claim presents an issue of first impression in Utah. He correctly
notes that the instant case is similar to, but distinguishable from, State v. Wright, 904
P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1995). Br. Aplt. at 7. Wright plead guilty to attempted
possession of incendiary device. Id. at 1102. The court orally sentenced him to
probation, but refused to enter a final judgment until it received a presentence
report. Id. After receiving the report, the court imposed a prison term rather than
probation and entered a final judgment order. Id. Wright appealed, claiming that
the court's modification of its oral sentence subjected him to double jeopardy. Id.
This Court held that no double jeopardy violation occurred because the sentence
was not final until the signed sentencing order was entered. Id. This Court later
clarified that holding in State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, 1 25, 17 P.3d 1145. It
explained in Horrocks that a court may modify an oral sentence without violating
double jeopardy only when the final order is not yet entered and the court has
specifically reserved the option to modify the sentence after receipt of further
information. Id.
Like Wright, the court here did not enter a signed final order when it put
defendant on probation. But the court also did not reserve the option of amending
the sentence, as required by Horrocks. Thus under Wright and Horrocks, jeopardy
attached and the trial court could not have increased defendant's sentence. Neither
Wright nor Horrocks controls the instant case, however, because both of those cases
9

concerned modifying an oral judgment before it becomes final. The question in the
instant case is whether a court revoking a defendant's probation may run the prison
term consecutive to a prison term for an intervening conviction.
1. Judge Reese properly determined, for the first and only
time, whether defendant's theft sentence would run
concurrently or consecutively to his aggravated robbery
sentencesDefendant's claim that Judge Reese increased his sentence rests, in part, on a
false premise: that Judge Noel imposed concurrent sentencing. He did not. Judge
Noel never stated whether defendant's theft sentence was to run concurrent or
consecutive, because there were no other sentences with which the theft sentence
could run concurrent or consecutive (R. 66-67; 55:1-16). At the time, defendant had
a clean record, except for some juvenile offenses, and was not in prison or on
probation (R. 55:12-13).
In fact, Judge Noel had no authority to designate defendant's sentence to run
consecutively or concurrently with any other sentence. Under Utah Code Ann. § 763-401(1) (West 2004), the court imposes consecutive or concurrent sentences "if a
defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense." In such
cases, the court determines "if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or
consecutively to each other" and also "if the sentences before the court are to run
concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already

10

serving/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(l)(a)-(b) (emphasis added). At defendant's
first sentencing, he had only one felony offense: theft. Judge Noel could not
therefore make any determination about whether the sentence would run
concurrent or consecutive with any other sentences.
Likewise, Judge Atherton did not, and could not, order defendant's theft
conviction to run concurrent to his aggravated robbery convictions. When she
sentenced defendant, he had another felony conviction, but he was not currently
serving any time for that conviction.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) lets the

sentencing judge order concurrent or consecutive sentencing only with "other
sentences the defendant is already serving/' Defendant was not serving time for his
theft sentence, so Judge Atherton could not order his aggravated robbery sentences
to run concurrent with his theft sentence.
Only Judge Reese could determine consecutive or concurrent sentencing for
defendant's aggravated robbery and theft sentences.

When he reinstated

defendant's prison term for theft, defendant was currently serving a prison term for
aggravated robbery. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1), Judge Reese had to
determine whether defendant's theft sentence would run concurrent with or
consecutive to his aggravated robbery sentences. As Judge Reese was the first and
only judge to make that determination, defendant's theft sentence was not increased
above its original term, and no double jeopardy violation occurred.
11

Even if Judge Noel or Judge Atherton had authority to order concurrent
service of defendant's theft and aggravated robbery convictions, their silence on the
issue does not suggest they meant to impose concurrent service. Utah's concurrent
and consecutive sentencing statute used to include a presumption of concurrent
sentencing, but that provision was removed by the legislature in 2002. See 2002
Laws of Utah 419. The version of the statute in effect when defendant was
sentenced by Judge Noel on December 4,2003, and currently in effect, contains no
such presumption. Instead, it states that when the written commitment order fails
to designate concurrent or consecutive sentencing, "the Board of Pardons and Parole
shall request clarification from the court." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). The
proper court to render that clarification is the court which committed defendant to
prison for theft, which in this case was Judge Reese's court.
2. Other courts to consider the issue have held that no
double jeopardy violation occurs at probation revocation
when a suspended prison term is reinstated and run
consecutively to a prison term the defendant is already
serving.
Although no Utah court has ever considered defendant's claim, other
jurisdictions disagree with him. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit stated that "a defendant whose probation has been revoked has no right to
have his original sentence reinstated concurrently to the sentence imposed on an
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intervening conviction/' United States v. Olivares-Martinez, 767 F.2d 1135,1139 (5th
Cir. 1985).
Olivares-Martinez pled guilty to attempting to transport an illegal alien. Id. at
1136. He was given a five-year prison term with all but six months suspended. Id.
While on probation after serving the six months, he was again convicted of
attempting to transport an illegal alien. Id. For that conviction, he was given three
years in prison. Id. The first court then revoked his probation and reinstated the
remaining four and half years of prison time, and ordered Olivares-Martinez to
serve the time consecutive to the three-year term. Id.
Olivares-Martinez appealed, claiming that the imposition of consecutive
sentences violated double jeopardy. In affirming, the Fifth Circuit noted that
Olivares-Martinez "was convicted on two different occasions for two separate
offenses" and that "consecutive sentences do not violate the double jeopardy clause
when imposed for separate criminal offenses." Id. at 1139. It further explained that
the decision to run the sentences consecutively was based on Olivares-Martinez's
misconduct during his probation, and that in such cases, double jeopardy is not
violated by consecutive sentences. Id.
Likewise, the highest court of West Virginia has held that double jeopardy is
not violated when probation is revoked and the original sentence of imprisonment
is ordered to run consecutively to an intervening sentence. See State v. Holcomb, 360
13

S.E.2d 232, 239 (W.Va. 1987). Holcomb pled guilty to breaking and entering and
was sentenced to a suspended prison term and three years probation. Id. at 234.
While on probation, Holcomb committed aggravated robbery and was sentenced to
ten years in prison. Id. The first court revoked Holcomb's probation and reinstated
his prison term to run consecutively with the aggravated robbery prison term. Id. at
235.
Holcomb appealed, asserting that the consecutive sentencing violated the
prohibition against double jeopardy. Id. at 239. The high court affirmed his
sentence, noting that he had been convicted of two separate crimes and that
"'[c]onsecutive sentences are an appropriate mechanism for imposing a distinct
punishment for each of two criminal acts/" Id. (quoting United States v. Lustig, 555
F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1977)). Accordingly, the court held that no double jeopardy
violation occurred.
The State is unaware of any court that has held that the imposition of
consecutive sentencing upon probation revocation violates double jeopardy. In fact,
several jurisdictions have held that even increasing the actual length of the original
sentence upon probation revocation does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
See Williams v. Wainwright, 493 F.Supp. 153,155 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (upholding against
double jeopardy claim a probation revocation in which the original sentence was
increased from one and a half years to fifteen years); State v. Jones, 418 N.W.2d 782,
14

784 (N.D. 1988) (reviewing a probation revocation and holding that "a decision to
resentence a defendant to a sentence greater than his original sentence does not
subject the defendant to multiple punishments for the same offense"); State v. Payne,
404 So.2d 1055,1057-59 (Fla. 1981) (upholding against double jeopardy challenge
increase of original sentence from one year to five years); State v. Perkins, 435 A.2d
504, 505-06 (N.H. 1981) (agreeing with states that have held that "a more severe
sentence may be imposed when the defendant violates probation and that the courts
are not limited to imposing only that portion of the original sentence which was
suspended"); Smith v. State, 307 N.E.2d 281, 282-83 (Ind. 1974) (upholding against
double jeopardy claim an increase of one year sentence to ten years). But see Nelson
v. States, 617 P.2d 502, 504 (Alaska 1981); State v. Ryan, 429 A.2d 332, 336-37 (N.J.
1981); Commonwealth v. Tomlin, 336 A.2d 407,409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
If the Double Jeopardy Clause permits an increased prison term after a
probation violation, it certainly permits reinstating a suspended prison term
consecutively with other terms the defendant is serving. Reinstating defendant's
prison term consecutively with the terms he was already serving did not increase
the actual length of his sentence for theft. The sentence is still and indeterminate
term of not more than five years in prison. Defendant has not therefore been subject
to double jeopardy.

15

C. Defendant failed to preserve his claim that the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering defendant to serve his
sentences consecutively.
Defendant asserts that "[e]ven if the trial judge had the ability to order the
previous sentence imposed to be served consecutively, the trial court abused its
discretion in this case by not considering the necessary statutory factors." Br. Aplt.
at 13. This claim is unpreserved.
As explained in point A of this brief, defendant may not raise claims for the
first time on appeal. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11 ( "As a general rule, claims not
raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal."). When the trial court
ordered consecutive sentencing, it stated, "The others are serious violent charges
apparently involving firearms, so IT1 impose this to run consecutively" (R. 55:19).
Defendant did not object to the trial court's determination that the seriousness of
defendant's intervening crimes warranted consecutive prison terms. He only
objected on the ground that the theft conviction preceded the aggravated robbery
convictions (R. 55:19).
In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. "A trial court abuses
its discretion in sentencing when, among other things, it 'fails to consider all legally
relevant factors'" State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, <f 8, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting State v.
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990)). A sentencing court is not required,
however, to state on the record its consideration of each legally relevant factor. See
16

Id. at % 11. Rather, this Court may assume that the sentencing court actually
considered the factors unless (1) an ambiguity of facts makes the assumption
unreasonable, (2) a statute explicitly provides that written findings must be made, or
(3) a prior case states that findings on an issue must be made. See id. When a court
is not required to make a record of its consideration of the legally relevant factors,
the sentence will be overturned "only when it is inherently unfair or clearly
excessive." Helms, 2002 UT 12, <f 14.
A consecutive zero to five prison term is not inherently unfair or clearly
excessive. This is particularly true when the prison term is imposed because
defendant committed a violent felony while on probation (R. 27-28).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted November 16,2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

MATTHEW D. BATES
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addendum

§ 76—3—401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the
order of judgment and commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to
each other; and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole,
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing
would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request,
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as
provided under Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct
which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction,
and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his
initial sentencing by any other court.

(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the m a n n e r in which they shall be served, the Board
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly
imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned'' means sentenced and committed
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 6 4 - 1 3 - 1 , the sentence has
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of
where the person is located.
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